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Post-Zoning: Alternative Forms 
of Public Land Use Controls 
INTRODUCTION 
Christopher Serkin & Gregg P. Macey† 
Zoning has had a remarkable run. Municipal zoning 
constitutes the central thread in the fabric of regulatory limits 
on land. It is among the most influential regulatory tools ever 
deployed, largely responsible for the shape of twentieth-century 
land development in the United States. But zoning remains 
controversial, even as we take it for granted. We decry its 
unintended consequences1 and exclusionary applications.2 
Traditional zoning is blamed for everything from automobile 
dependency, fringe development, and low-density sterility3 to the 
racial dynamics of post-Katrina New Orleans.4 Despite these 
  
 † Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Associate Professor of Law, 
Brooklyn Law School. The authors would like to thank the participants of this 
symposium for their thoughtful contributions. 
 1 Michael Wolf encourages us to consider the themes of “exclusion, 
anticompetitiveness, parochialism, and aestheticism” that make an appearance in Justice 
Sutherland’s storied validation of zoning in Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See 
Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND 
THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP 253 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. 
Kayden eds., 1989); see also JONATHAN BARNETT, THE FRACTURED METROPOLIS: 
IMPROVING THE NEW CITY, RESTORING THE OLD CITY, RESHAPING THE REGION 47 (1995). 
 2 Juliana Maantay, Zoning Law, Health, and Environmental Justice: What’s the 
Connection?, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 572, 579-83 (2002); Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The 
Inequitable Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 101. 
 3 See, e.g., Edward H. Ziegler, The Case for Megapolitan Growth 
Management in the 21st Century: Regional Urban Planning and Sustainable 
Development in the United States, 41 URB. LAW. 147, 150-51 (2009). 
 4 See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved 
with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State of Mind in Antidiscrimination Law, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1189-91 (2007). For an account of progressive-era programs in 
New Orleans and their influence over the racialization of disaster vulnerability, see 
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and other criticisms, zoning persists and remains faithful to its 
original goal: separating incompatible uses of land.5  
Zoning, of course, has not been a completely static 
institution.6 Planners have introduced new tools like incentive, 
performance, and overlay zoning.7 But even these innovations 
continue to take the separation of land by use as their point of 
departure. New, twenty-first-century challenges are likely to 
require more dramatic reconsiderations of land use controls. 
Issues like sea-level rise, the breakdown of the urban 
“transect,” and novel sources of fine-grained externalities 
within communities are putting greater pressure on zoning. 
Will zoning be able to address change at new varieties of scale? 
In the words of Justice Sutherland, will zoning adequately 
“expand or contract” in response to changed circumstances as 
sublocal and global changes mount?8  
In the spring of 2012, the Brooklyn Law Review 
assembled a group of the nation’s leading land use experts to 
consider these questions in a symposium broadly titled, Post-
Zoning: Alternative Forms of Public Land Use Controls. Their 
papers, assembled in this issue, provide a snapshot of cutting-
edge thinking about land use policy. Several themes emerged 
from the symposium, including a focus on sublocal decision 
making and broader questions of scale, a need to generate 
information about land use impacts, an expansion of zoning’s 
goals, and a reconsideration of legal limits in response to these 
trends. Underlying the papers is a push to grapple with 
zoning’s ability to respond to change, particularly at different 
scales. Taken together, the authors in this issue call for 
considerably broader thinking about zoning’s purpose and 
function in light of new pressures on land use. In this 
introduction, we set the stage for this collection of papers, 
briefly exploring zoning’s origins and its traditionally limited 
  
Craig E. Colten, Basin Street Blues: Drainage and Environmental Equity in New 
Orleans, 1890–1930, 28 J. HIST. GEO. 237 (2002). 
 5 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391 (1926) (“[T]he 
exclusion of buildings devoted to business, trade, etc., from residential districts, bears a 
rational relation to the health and safety of the community.”). 
 6 Nestor M. Davidson, Property’s Morale, 110 MICH. L. REV. 437, 481 (2011). 
 7 See, e.g., John J. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the 
Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 586 (1972); Luther L. 
McDougal, III, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47 
TUL. L. REV. 255, 257 (1973); Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New 
Urbanism on Local Ordinances: The Twilight of Zoning?, 35 URB. LAW. 783, 785 (2003). 
 8 Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387. 
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repertoire for anticipating needs and adjusting to change—
whether within districts or across vast regions.  
Zoning emerged as an alternative to common law 
responses to development pressures.9 The co-location of homes 
and manufacturing facilities, even before the Industrial 
Revolution took hold, revealed the common law’s limited ability 
to regulate incompatible land uses. Nuisance law relied on case-
by-base litigation between neighbors—that is, ex post 
adjudication of land use conflicts. What was needed instead was 
a mechanism for preventing such conflicts before they occurred. 
Zoning offered one. Early codes separated slaughterhouses from 
homes, and industry from residential neighborhoods more 
generally.10 These ordinances evolved into controls of use as well 
as height, bulk, and location of structures on parcels in Los 
Angeles,11 New York City, and elsewhere, ultimately culminating 
in the Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA).12  
Underlying the early promulgation of comprehensive 
zoning was an implicit faith in planners’ capacity to anticipate 
and shape future development needs. In part, we can trace this 
faith to methods of scientific inquiry that prevailed in the first 
half of the twentieth century. For example, ecology—a branch 
of biological science concerned with the interconnectedness of 
living systems and their environments—became an established 
field just as industrial activity started to pressure 
neighborhoods and commercial districts, threatening their 
quality of life.13 Zoning followed one of ecology’s early 
methodologies of dividing natural areas into sections, taking a 
representative sample of those areas, and carefully counting 
the organisms they contained.14 This technique, known as the 
quadrat method, lent an impression of stable “life zones” and 
spoke to a deeply embedded belief among scientists in the 
“balance of nature.”15 Ecologists from this era embraced “end-
  
 9 For private law’s limited ability to anticipate and remedy local 
environmental harms, see Edward Brunet, Debunking Wholesale Private Enforcement 
of Environmental Rights, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 313-18 (1992).  
 10 See, e.g., 1871 Mass. Acts 534, ch. 167, available at http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/ 
actsResolves/1871/1871acts0167.pdf; NEW HAVEN, CONN., ORDINANCES §§ 253-54 (1898), 
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2027/nnc1.cu56571828. 
 11 See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Ex Parte Quong Wo, 118 
P. 714, 715 (Cal. 1911); Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 72 P. 970 (Cal. 1903). 
 12 SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 147, 201-02 (1969). 
 13 Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science 
on American Law: An Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 847, 849 (1994). 
 14 Id. at 851. 
 15 Id. at 855-56; see also Jonathan Baert Wiener, Beyond the Balance of 
Nature, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 7-8 (1996).  
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state” planning, arguing that “succession,” the “process[] by 
which one plant community replaces another in successive 
waves[,] . . . would end in a climax state, at which point . . . the 
landscape [would reach] its natural condition of equilibrium.”16 
When the Commerce Department promulgated the SZEA as 
model legislation for the states, the idea of succession had 
migrated to urban planning as an approach to identify the 
“highest and best use” of land and protect that use as it was 
reached.17 Herein was zoning’s implicit argument against 
common law land use controls: they did not ensure predictable 
remedies or encourage stable outcomes. In order to achieve 
that, one needed the equivalent of urban “quadrats” that 
contained building stock of various classifications.  
Zoning assumed, among other things, that “similar uses 
in cities tend to congregate to form homogeneous units readily 
identifiable by the technical expert,” that “urban land values in 
cities shift on a slow and consistent basis,” and that “past 
trends can be extrapolated into the future.”18 These ideas were 
integrated into the SZEA, which most state legislatures quickly 
adopted.19 The SZEA envisioned comprehensive municipal 
controls dividing jurisdictions into use districts of varying 
intensities. Single-family residential communities would be 
protected from noxious industry, and commercial uses would be 
clustered together.20 The basic rationale for zoning extended 
beyond what court-made doctrine could accomplish and 
promised greater foresight than disparate nuisance-prevention 
efforts. But the early science of ecology proved to be incorrect. 
Ecology has since adopted a “nonequilibrium” paradigm that is 
more aware of the extent to which natural systems can be 
engineered.21 And the aims of local governments and the forces 
that threaten stability today share little with the nuisance-
internalization concerns of a century ago. 
Zoning has not stood still in the years since it was first 
adopted. Its complexity increased considerably during the 
  
 16 Bosselman & Tarlock, supra note 13, at 855 (footnotes omitted).  
 17 Id. at 857 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also M. CHRISTINE BOYER, 
DREAMING THE RATIONAL CITY: THE MYTH OF AMERICAN CITY PLANNING 221 (1983). 
 18 Charles M. Haar, Reflections on Euclid: Social Contract and Private 
Purpose, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 1, at 343. 
 19 Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a 
Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 848-49 (1983). 
 20 Andrew J. Cappel, Note, A Walk Along Willow: Patterns of Land Use 
Coordination in Pre-Zoning New Haven (1870–1926), 101 YALE L.J. 617, 617 n.1 (1991). 
 21 A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial 
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1128-30 (1994). 
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twentieth century, although it remained focused on separating 
uses in increasingly fine-grained ways rather than responding to 
new kinds of land use pressures. New York, for example, 
amended its zoning resolution over 2000 times between 1916 
and 1961.22 In some regions, urban land was at first overzoned 
for commercial and industrial uses, a practice that confined 
residential zones to limited portions of major cities.23 Land use 
categories proliferated, from four in the 1916 resolution to 
dozens (or more) in present-day cities such as Fresno and New 
York.24 The Boards of Appeals sought to keep up with change, 
interpreting vague criteria for whether to grant variance 
requests or allow nonconforming uses to reap a reasonable rate 
of return.25 Density controls and other zoning improvements in 
the 1960s acknowledged zoning’s impact on urban form but 
continued to ignore the unique makeup of communities where 
they were applied.26 Other innovations, such as floor area 
bonuses and incentive zoning techniques, were as likely to yield 
a sterile built environment as they were to generate vibrant 
public spaces.27 Much of the rift between zoning and land use 
challenges in these early decades was to be expected. After all, 
at the onset of comprehensive zoning, “supermarkets, chain 
stores, and shopping centers [were] unknown,” industries “had 
not yet begun to abandon their multistory lofts for suburban 
  
 22 See N.Y.C. CITY PLANNING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE 
AMENDMENT OF THE ZONING RESOLUTION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (CP-15820), at 
696 (1960). 
 23 William H. Wilson, Moles and Skylarks, in INTRODUCTION TO PLANNING 
HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES 88, 97 (Donald A. Krueckeberg ed., 1983) (“[T]he 
zoning laws followed New York’s famed 1916 resolution, which permitted, under full 
utilization, working space for some 300 million employees. . . . The other side of the 
overzoning coin was the underzoning of residential property.”). 
 24 Compare STANISLAW J. MAKIELSKI, JR., THE POLITICS OF ZONING: THE NEW 
YORK EXPERIENCE 36 (1966), with FRESNO, CAL., MUN. CODE § 12-201 (2012) 
(“Designation of Zoning Districts”), available at 
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientId=14478, and N.Y.C. Dep’t of City Planning, 
Zoning Districts: Introduction to Zoning Districts, NYC.GOV, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonehis2.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). 
 25 ALEXANDER GARVIN, THE AMERICAN CITY: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 
371 (1996). 
 26 Id. at 366-67. Kevin Lynch explored what are at times the counterintuitive 
links among density, urban form, and quality of life in his classic text, Good City Form. 
KEVIN LYNCH, GOOD CITY FORM 261-65 (1981). Density interacts with other elements of 
the built environment, including whether the mixture of building types is coarse- or 
fine-grained, and the spatial and temporal distribution of access channels. Id. at 265-75. 
 27 JEROLD S. KAYDEN, PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC SPACE: THE NEW YORK CITY 
EXPERIENCE 11-18 (2000). 
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locations,” and “[c]ars, trucks, and planes had not yet become 
the dominant forms of transportation.”28  
In the face of so much change, zoning today has become 
at once overly simplistic and stultifyingly complex. Even with 
its many innovations, zoning has remained true to its original 
goals. It ignores demographic shifts and design implications 
while making it difficult to comply with existing ordinances 
through the use of overlays, conditions, and exceptions.  
Criticisms of zoning’s implicit pursuit of steady-state 
development are hardly new, raised most eloquently by Jane 
Jacobs in the 1960s.29 Zoning has had time to internalize 
Jacobs’s observations—most notably, her argument that mixed-
use developments, particularly on larger parcels, generate 
positive externalities and contribute to more vital urban 
space.30 Planned unit developments and overlay districts can be 
conducive to the kinds of communities that she envisioned. But 
these techniques are effectively add-ons—regulatory tweaks 
that operate within zoning’s existing framework. Zoning’s 
fundamental structure remains largely unchanged. It is what 
zoning is called upon to do that looks very different.  
For example, modern development pressures draw 
much of the motivation for zoning away from planning and 
toward fiscal concerns.31 Control over land use decisions gives 
municipalities leverage to extract valuable concessions from 
developers.32 In principle, those concessions are meant as a 
buffer against the costs imposed by development, whether 
through localized environmental impacts, burdens on 
infrastructure, or broader congestion. But even as developers 
make concessions or take steps to offset costs, those offsetting 
benefits might not go to those most affected by new projects. 
Rent seeking at the local level means that the ultimate 
distribution of development benefits may overlook those 
bearing costs such as increased traffic and added stress to 
municipal services. This inequitable distribution is partly a 
problem of the scale of change ushered in by new development. 
Scholars have frequently pointed to interlocal externalities 
from municipal decisions as a reason for regional or even 
  
 28 GARVIN, supra note 25, at 364. 
 29 JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 252 (1961). 
 30 Jay Wickersham, Jane Jacobs’s Critique of Zoning: From Euclid to 
Portland and Beyond, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547, 553-54 (2001). 
 31 Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 591, 604-06 (2011). 
 32 Cf. Rose, supra note 19, at 890-91. 
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federal planning.33 But the problem of concentrated sublocal 
harms points to a different manifestation of the scale problem. 
It suggests that land use decisions may sometimes occur at a 
higher level than necessary—at the level of the municipality, 
instead of the more proximate community. 
Zoning has reached something of a crossroads. Issues of 
scale in response to change are increasingly important, while 
the objectives that underlie zoning are newly up for grabs. It is 
against this backdrop that the papers in this issue push the 
discussion forward in important new directions. 
In this symposium, zoning’s role in allocating costs and 
benefits to address sublocal change is most explicit in Rachel 
Godsil’s discussion of gentrification.34 Her contribution to this 
issue poses a deceptively simple question for zoning: to what 
degree should it privilege the interests of existing (“in-place”) 
residents during times of dramatic demographic change? From 
the perspective of a municipality, opposition to gentrification may 
be interpreted as irrational or self-defeating. But gentrification 
reflects improvements in the economic conditions of an area that 
not everyone will embrace. Godsil looks closely at the sublocal 
distributional consequences of gentrification and the racial 
dynamics at work. Finding that gentrification can unfairly disrupt 
existing communities, Godsil proposes a series of responses to 
protect the interests of in-place residents, spanning from rent 
regulation or housing vouchers in gentrifying communities to 
active involvement by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to “[a]ffirmatively [f]urther[] [f]air [g]entrification.”35  
William Fischel shares Godsil’s interest in using zoning 
at the sublocal level to resist broader municipal trends. Fischel 
identifies a gap in land use controls that falls between citywide 
zoning and consensual neighborhood covenants.36 That gap 
persists, despite the rise of homeowner associations and related 
private governance tools. There are two reasons for this. First, 
private associations often fail to take hold in built-up areas. 
Second, neighborhoods that are part of larger polities have less 
  
 33 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in 
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1996); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land 
Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397, 1404-08 (2012); Laurie Reynolds, 
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 
WASH. L. REV. 93, 109 (2003). 
 34 See Rachel D. Godsil, The Gentrification Trigger: Autonomy, Mobility, and 
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 319 (2013). 
 35 Id. at 337. 
 36 See William A. Fischel, Neighborhood Conservation Districts: The New Belt 
and Suspenders of Municipal Zoning, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 339 (2013). 
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influence over changed conditions than those featured in 
Fischel’s “homevoter” model of small-town and suburban 
politics.37 According to Fischel, one possible answer to the lack of 
“voice” for residents of such communities during times of change 
is the neighborhood conservation district (NCD).38 This 
innovation embodies the promise of preservation without the 
need to wrestle with historic designation.39 NCDs give sublocal 
communities the power to review proposed land use changes and 
enact through public law a subset of the protections against 
change that are available to common interest communities.40 
They offer immediate neighbors the ability to protect their 
interests more directly than through broader municipal decision 
making. Of course, adding a layer of regulatory authority 
increases the costs of change. And neighborhood conservation 
districts present a problem that Godsil identifies: how to set out 
the appropriate level of protection for neighborhoods within larger 
polities. But the framework and restrictions that NCDs introduce 
offer a creative expression of pressure for sublocal involvement in 
how a municipality manages and responds to change. 
Community benefits agreements (CBAs) offer another. 
As Alejandro Camacho explains, they give community-based 
organizations—a different kind of sublocal concern—both a 
voice in the development process and an opportunity to protect 
members’ interests by extracting promises from developers.41 
Camacho points out that zoning’s flexibility historically derived 
from bilateral negotiation with regulators over variances, 
conditional use permits, or development agreements. These 
approaches often left out the interests of community groups. 
Equally important, the bilateral model discouraged monitoring 
and adjustment of zoning decisions—institutional mechanisms 
that are necessary to respond to changed circumstances.42 
Because CBAs include a series of promises that burden and run 
with the land, they set the groundwork for relationship 
building that can facilitate contingency planning among 
  
 37 Id. at 345; see also WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 4, 
14-16 (2001). 
 38 See Adam Lovelady, Note, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and 
the Role of Neighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URB. LAW. 147, 148-54 (2008). 
 39 Id. at 154. 
 40 Compare Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 697, 710-14 (2010), with Lovelady, supra note 38, at 148-54.  
 41 Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the 
Antidote, of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 355, 361-63, 365 (2013). 
 42 Id. at 360-61. 
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numerous parties.43 The challenges of representation, coalition 
formation, capacity building, and enforcement posed by CBAs 
are legion.44 But CBAs are an increasingly prevalent tool for 
responding to development-driven, sublocal change.  
The proposals for sublocal control in this issue are 
balanced by an emphasis on more disaggregated responses to 
change. Lee Fennell’s proposal to crowdsource information about 
land use preferences, intentions, and impacts is a clear example.45 
Traditional zoning relies on imperfect information. Most 
crucially, it inadequately addresses impacts of use-based 
planning experienced on adjacent land or across successive 
periods of ownership. Instead, zoning is informed by vague 
assumptions—for instance, that one type of use will have certain 
effects on another, or that the scale of development pursued 
today will remain efficient during some later time period. 
Planners bridge these information shortfalls with sophisticated 
tools like hedonic regression analysis, but they populate their 
models with proxies and use them to generate forecasts rather 
than actual impacts.46 Fennell’s project encourages the public to 
reveal information about land use intensity and quality of life 
through smartphones and other platforms.47 This would replace—
or supplement—planners’ technical expertise with facts on the 
ground. But measuring impacts is, in a sense, an ex post 
treatment of sublocal externalities. New tools for gauging ambient 
noise and air quality can only speak to existing conditions. Such 
information can inform future decision making, but it is otherwise 
limited to the effects of decisions already made. Fennell therefore 
proposes another information-based approach: an options 
exchange that elicits data about future preferences and desires.48 
This proposal seeks to reveal consumer preference information 
and “execute binding property instruments” to lock in those 
preferences over time.49 
Stewart Sterk provides another method to harness the 
power of market mechanisms. Sterk reviews existing 
  
 43 Id. at 367. 
 44 Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government 
Tool or Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 21-31 (2010). 
 45 Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385, 387 (2013). 
 46 Models in support of regulatory behavior pose a variety of limitations and 
concerns. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Elizabeth Fisher & Pasky Pascual, 
Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 293, 308-13 (2010). 
 47 Fennell, supra note 45, at 392-93. 
 48 See Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 24-31 (2011). 
 49 Fennell, supra note 45, at 402. 
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approaches to limiting “localized externalities” (and those that 
extend beyond a development’s immediate environs) and hones 
in on the added costs of these approaches: they establish 
unrelated restrictions, cater to a skewed mix of organized 
interests, and rely on rules that are both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.50 His solution is for local governments to price 
the effects of land uses and allow property owners to adjust 
accordingly. Sterk suggests that land use regulations could be 
augmented by taxes that are better tailored to the externalized 
costs of development and avoid the problems attendant to 
discretionary review.51 This differs from Fennell’s proposal for 
an options-pricing scheme because a centralized authority 
rather than a market would price externalities. But once prices 
are set, the market would give property owners what amounts 
to a menu of options at pre-specified prices. Supplementing 
zoning with development taxes expands the options available 
for adding fine-grained flexibility to land use controls. 
A final attempt to expand zoning’s flexibility can be 
found in the use of land transfer programs that direct, rather 
than respond to, development patterns. Chief among these 
efforts is the repurposing of transferable development rights 
(TDRs). TDRs are not new, but Vicki Been and John Infranca 
argue that New York City utilizes them to replace traditional 
forms of flexibility such as upzonings and zoning lot mergers.52 
In the past, developers sought exemptions from strict zoning 
limits by merging lots to create greater bulk limits or 
requesting rezoning to a more permissive designation. But 
these options faced structural limitations—the former 
requiring ownership of lots to merge, and the latter requiring 
affirmative regulatory action. TDRs themselves have been used 
primarily to relieve the rigidity of existing zoning designations. 
Now, New York and other cities are departing more completely 
from zoning constraints through subdistricting designations 
and TDRs built into comprehensive redevelopment efforts.53 As 
many of the authors in this issue point out, land use controls 
fail to address change when they proceed from a limited 
analysis of the impacts they will encourage. The same is true of 
transfer programs, which were applied at times without 
  
 50 Stewart E. Sterk, Exploring Taxation as a Substitute for Overregulation in 
the Development Process, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 417, 422-23 (2013). 
 51 Id. at 431-34. 
 52 Vicki Been & John Infranca, Transferable Development Rights Programs: 
“Post-Zoning”?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 435, 438 (2013). 
 53 Id. at 439-40. 
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sufficient awareness of urban design consequences or burdens 
on landowners. Been and Infranca chronicle how TDRs have 
moved beyond the strictures of lot-by-lot density controls. 
Often, as in Manhattan’s High Line Transfer Corridor, using 
TDRs to direct not only the intensity but also the form of 
development has yielded stunning results for the character of 
neighborhoods where they are applied.54 
In addition to exploring sublocal and disaggregated 
responses to change, contributors to this symposium identified 
a dramatic expansion in zoning’s objectives. Courts and 
commentators have long recognized zoning’s movement beyond 
the “orthodox quartet” of permissible police power regulations: 
“health, safety, morals, [and] general welfare” (at least as 
narrowly drawn).55 With the New Deal expansion of the scope of 
the police power came opportunities to use zoning authority to 
pursue broader goals.56 One such goal is conservation, which fits 
uneasily within traditional land use controls. While zoning can 
limit growth in an area, it is generally ill-suited to prevent 
growth altogether. Some local governments adopt “holding 
zones” by, say, designating large swaths of land for agricultural 
use only.57 But this raises a host of doctrinal problems, imposes 
significant burdens on affected property owners without 
corresponding benefits, and—at least where the goal is 
conservation—amounts to a regulatory sleight of hand, treating 
agricultural use as synonymous with conservation. 
Conservation easements have emerged as a tool for local 
governments to pursue conservation directly, as a kind of 
private-law alternative to zoning. Gerald Korngold points out 
that local governments increasingly acquire conservation 
easements, and he notes that this affects land’s development 
potential as much as, if not more than, traditional zoning.58 If at 
a later time municipalities adopt different conservation 
strategies, they can modify or release the easements they hold. 
  
 54 Id. at 449-52. 
 55 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 114-15 (3d ed. 2005). 
 56 For a history of the expansion of police power regulations and its impact on 
land use regulation, see Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom 
Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 838-74 
(2006). A classic battleground for this expansion is in the area of aesthetic regulation. 
See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 55, at 469-505. 
 57 Gerald Korngold, Governmental Conservation Easements: A Means to 
Advance Efficiency, Freedom from Coercion, Flexibility, and Democracy, 78 BROOK. L. 
REV. 467, 472-76 (2013). 
 58 Id. 
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By comparison, a municipality must use eminent domain to 
eliminate privately held conservation easements.59 In addition, 
conservation easements give local governments a means to 
implement more fine-grained decisions. Instead of requiring a 
zoning ordinance to distinguish among the environmental 
sensitivity of various parcels—an endeavor that could require 
lot-level distinctions—a government can acquire conservation 
easements over the precise property it wants to protect.  
A similar expansion of regulatory purpose, driven by the 
changing scale of land use impacts, is on display in the use of 
development controls to anticipate sea-level rise. According to 
John Nolon, Euclidian zoning was complicit in this country’s 
pattern of sprawl development.60 Separating incompatible uses 
encouraged segregation of homes, jobs, and commercial needs, 
leading—in many places—to the consumption of open space 
and a reliance on cars for commuting and errands. Built 
structures themselves are responsible for a tremendous 
amount of energy use in the United States, and building codes 
and design requirements also influence carbon emissions. 
Thus, local land use regulations arguably contribute to sea-
level rise. A concern for sea-level rise, and for climate change 
more generally, encourages the deployment of municipal land 
use and building regulations to create transit-oriented 
development and more energy-efficient buildings. This, of 
course, reflects an expansion of the traditional purposes of 
zoning and land use controls. Instead of separating 
incompatible uses, the goal is to minimize environmental 
impacts on a broader scale—to limit, in essence, the global 
externalities of local land use decisions, as opposed to smaller-
scale externalities among neighbors. Nolon explores a 
combination of development-control and informational 
mechanisms to preserve natural floodplains, protect streams 
and “soft” barriers against the sea, and reveal risks attendant 
to inundation of development in the future. The goal is to 
encourage developers to account for the risks of sea-level rise in 
siting decisions and project design. 
Nicole Garnett’s examination of form-based codes 
speaks to another expansion of regulatory purpose: focusing on 
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the form of built structures rather than the use of land.61 The 
goal of form-based codes is to create municipalities with certain 
design features and more dense urban cores. Proponents of 
form-based codes advocate “scrap[ping] traditional zoning 
codes, which regulate based upon property uses, in favor of a 
regulatory system that targets building density and form.”62 As is 
true of each of the innovations chronicled in this issue, form-
based codes present their own risks. First, they are meant to 
supplement zoning according to the “transect,” the supposed 
progression of development from urban to less-intense uses of 
land. Form-based codes dictate the architectural elements that 
should proliferate along different parts of the urban transect. In 
practice, development does not adhere to this planning principle: 
it might follow more uniform density gradients, as in Los 
Angeles, or proceed along alternating gradients, as in Phoenix.  
But with new forms and purposes of municipal land use 
controls come new risks. Garnett worries, for example, that the 
embrace of form-based codes can micromanage the details of 
building forms, making the codes both difficult to follow and 
inappropriate impositions of aesthetic preferences.63 
Crowdsourcing information also raises complicated issues of 
participation and voice. If data collection is more available to 
some people than others, their concerns may be given greater 
weight in land use decisions.64 Likewise, CBAs raise difficult 
questions of representation, with the developer often driving the 
process without the benefit of procedural safeguards such as 
those found in New York City’s Uniform Land Use Review 
Process.65 Some of the approaches, including NCDs, add layers of 
approval or otherwise increase the cost of regulatory compliance, 
potentially restricting the supply of new developments.66 
With a sense of these concerns, Richard Epstein adds a 
cautionary note to the project of exploring the scale of land use 
controls and the management of change.67 As he quite rightly 
anticipates, the principal concern of the papers in this 
symposium is that “zoning law has proved inadequate to 
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grapple with all the complex issues of land use, so that 
additional systems are needed in order to pick up the slack.”68 
For Epstein, this is troubling because the legal—and 
specifically, constitutional—protections for property owners are 
already insufficient to address traditional forms of regulatory 
incursion. He argues that much of the intellectual foundation for 
that protection is based on a misunderstanding of the 
relationship between states’ police power and the Takings 
Clause.69 Instead of the ad hoc balancing test that informs 
takings jurisprudence, Epstein argues for the application of 
more bright-line rules, designed to protect property owners from 
implicit expropriations under the guise of regulation. Epstein 
would no doubt agree that judicial oversight of the regulatory 
innovations described in this issue is even more up for grabs.  
Stepping back from the details of this exceptional 
collection of papers, each shares a concern over traditional 
zoning’s ability to respond to changing conditions and a desire 
to replace (or at least to augment) top-down, technocratic 
decision making with more responsive controls at different 
scales. What is most striking about the contributions, then, is 
their unusually bold modesty. This is not an oxymoron. The 
proposals are innovative, from crowdsourcing zoning 
preferences to implementing neighborhood conservation 
districts and replacing development controls with land use 
taxes. But they reflect a certain skepticism about zoning’s 
ability to achieve optimal land use outcomes. Part of this comes 
from the broader range of externalities that land use 
regulations are meant to confront. The focus reflected in these 
papers is no longer—at least not exclusively—the kinds of 
municipal conflicts that zoning historically was meant to 
forestall. The focus is simultaneously narrower and broader, 
from the sublocal effects of gentrification to global concerns 
such as climate change. Whether or not zoning can adapt to 
these sources of concern, there can be little doubt that the post-
zoning world is fast approaching. It heralds new, and at times 
unique, threats to public welfare. The legal system will have to 
account for them as it continues to evolve. The first step in 
understanding that evolution is to recognize the changes that 
are underway. The papers in this symposium focus our 
attention on those changes.  
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